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Abstract
Most discussions of the Greek debt overhang have focussed on the
implications for Greece. We show that when additional funds released to
the debtor (Greece), via debt restructuring, are used efficiently in pur-
suit of a practicable business plan, then both debtor and creditor can
benefit. We examine a dynamic two country model calibrated to Greek
and German economies and support two-steady states, one with endoge-
nous default and one without, depending on creditors expectations. In
the default steady state, debt forgiveness lowers the volatility of both
German and Greek consumption whereas demanding higher recovery
rates has the opposite effect.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we examine the interaction between a set of debtors, whom we
characterize as Greeks, and a set of creditors, whom we term Germans. We
outline the circumstances that may make the Greek debtors choose to renege,
to default, on an (unsecured) portion of their debt, dependent on the various
costs which such default entails. The costs and benefits of default are quite
complex, and we have modelled these carefully.
In our model, creditors (Germans) can be more or less tough, (forgiving
being the inverse of tough), in imposing penalties on the defaulting Greeks.
We model this as a ‘recovery’ rate, whereby the German creditors can grab,
and use for themselves (i.e. recover), a larger share (a higher recovery rate),
of the underlying defaulted assets.
Most of the debate on the costs/benefits of default and renegotiation have
primarily focussed on the effects and trade-offs for the debtors’ (Greeks), while
the effects on creditors have largely been ignored, or assume to be negative 1.
The language of the discussion has been couched within the framework of a
“zero-sum” game, and in other words the assumption that any debt relief to
Greece must entail a (net present value) transfer of resources from creditors.
What we show is that, under a set of plausible conditions, greater for-
giveness (a lower recovery rate) by the creditors currently can benefit both
debtors and lenders. These conditions include reasonable prospects for the
profitability of future investment by the debtors (in Greece) and a willingness
of the debtors to apply available funds to such investment. If these condi-
1See Zettelmeyer et al. (2013), Ardagna and Caselli (2014) and Broner et al. (2014) for
analysis of Greek restructuring episodes since 2010.
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tions hold, then the short-term loss to the creditors (Germans) from being
more forgiving would be more than matched by longer-term higher returns
from their remaining investments in Greece, and an overall lower volatility of
German consumption (welfare). We, nevertheless, implicitly assume that the
Greek economy operates below its potential output and, hence additional in-
vestment may generate substantial GNP growth. This may seem paradoxical
for the Greek economy as it has contracted in an unprecedented rate of over
25% during the last seven years. However, Greece’s growth rates were often
exceeding 10% during the 1950s resembling those of modern tiger economies
in the late 1990s. Likewise, industrial production increased at a rate of 10%
mostly during the 1960s. Greece consistently outperformed most European
economies for most of the second world war period2.
The events of 2009 heralded a paradigm shift in Greece’s economic condi-
tions. Prior to this, Greece experienced a prolonged period of economic growth,
averaging 5% year-on-year, since the late 1990s and, furthermore, Greek credit-
spreads were virtually zero. Creditors and investors viewed Greece as a safe,
low-risk, investment destination. Reconciling this period with what followed, is
then challenging, particularly from a modelling perspective. Certainly, several
different factors contributed to the onset of the crisis in 2009, including fluctu-
ations in credit spreads, a collapse of demand globally, and, most importantly,
the realisation that the twin deficits and the national debt-to-gdp ratio were
unsustainable.3 We argue that, in addition to the issues described in Gourin-
chas et al. (2016), the economic fundamentals of the Greek economy did not
2See Bitzenis et al. (2015).
3Gourinchas et al. (2016) describes these as the ‘Trifecta’ of a Sovereign Debt Crisis,
Banking Crisis and Sudden Stop.
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suddenly change in 2009, rather, expectations were destabilised. Consequently
creditor’s expectations about the ability of Greeks to honour their contractual
obligations radically changed, and, therefore, credit-spreads rose steeply. In
addition, a temporary relative decline in productive efficiency, moved the econ-
omy from growth and stability to contraction and instability. In our model,
we capture these effects by supporting two steady state equilibria. One where
default does not occur, and Greece can freely issue debt at the risk-free rate,
and another, the one we emphasise, where default and renegotiation occurs.
What this underlines is the need for any such renegotiation to be accompa-
nied by a business plan for the debtors (Greece), indicating how they can use
additional funding to grow their way out of their (temporary) hole. A second
requirement is for some commitment device to relate the release of additional
funding (forgiveness) to the debtor (Greece) to their application of such extra
funds to the business plan as originally developed and agreed between debtor
and creditor. Put differently, we require that the business plan is time con-
sistent and individually rational. More importantly this plan needs not to be
imposed by the creditors but, rather, voluntarily be adopted and committed
to fully by the debtors.
The need to come up with such a business plan, and conditionality in
releasing funds if, and only if, such plans are carried out, is a commonplace
in cases of commercial bankruptcy; but we believe that we are original both
in relating this to current Greek sovereign renegotiation, and in doing so in a
rigorous model, outlining formally and mathematically the various costs and
benefits of default and renegotiation.4
4Indeed, the argument that restructuring is synonymous with default was put forward
by Tsomocos in 2011 on the day of the restructuring of Greek debt (“Skai News Channel”,
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If such conditions can be met, we would then argue that immediate restruc-
turing that reduces the present value of debt, would benefit both Greece as well
as its creditor countries over the medium and long term. We consider a two
country RBC model, describing Greece as the debtor nation, and Germany, the
main creditor nation. Greek households can issue both secured and unsecured
debt to German households and the possibility of renegotiating on unsecured
debt exists. Renegotiation occurs because we explicitly model the decision to
default and show that the default channel, that exacerbates the volatility of
consumption, may actually be reduced with more lenient debt restructuring
terms. Put another way, we argue that the dilemma is not whether there is
a moral duty of creditor nations to transfer resources to Greece, but whether
creditors are willing to trade off short-term losses for medium and long-run
gains.
In our model we assume that the Greek capital stock, in addition to in-
ternal financing, is externally financed by secured and unsecured debt. Debt
can be either secured, in which case failure to honour the debt would invoke
bankruptcy proceedings which are ruled out, or unsecured, in which case the
lender has a limited claim on the existing wealth of the borrower and cannot
invoke bankruptcy proceedings. Thus a key feature of the paper is that the
possibility of default in equilibrium exists on unsecured debt.
We assume that Greek households can only issue non-state-contingent bonds.
Debtors may choose to renege on some of their debt obligations, but then suffer
a renegotiation cost. In order to be able to borrow again, they must pay this
cost and, in this sense, the decision to default is strategic. In our model, the
Interview, 27 October, 2011).
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possibility of default is micro-founded on the moral hazard relationship prob-
lem between debtors and creditors. If debtors default, they incur a welfare
cost in renegotiations proportional to the scale of default.
This cost effectively creates a borrowing constraint and stems from Shubik
and Wilson. (1977) and Dubey et al. (2005) and applied in Tsomocos (2003),
Goodhart et al. (2005) and Goodhart et al. (2006). In the RBC literature,
our model shares similar features to De Walque et al. (2010). Our closest
methodological precursors are Peiris and Tsomocos (2015) (which studies a
two period large open international economy with incomplete markets and
default); Goodhart et al. (2013), which explores the effect of international
capital flow taxation on default and welfare in a deterministic two period large
open economy; and Walsh (2015a) and Walsh (2015b), which consider default
in a small open dynamic incomplete markets economy. In these latter two
papers, the marginal cost of default depends on the level of wealth, so the
propensity to default depends on business cycle fluctuations. We follow this
notion here by introducing a macrovariable that governs the marginal cost of
renegotiating debt (default), termed ‘credit conditions’.
We argue that credit-conditions can be adequately captured by an appro-
priate state variable in order to describe the relationship between loan delin-
quencies and capital stock. We hasten to add that the debtor country takes
the credit-conditions variable as given since creditors are capable of impos-
ing institutional arrangements that are non-negotiable.5 Our economy dis-
plays the minimum features necessary to highlight the role that an aggregate
credit-conditions variable plays in amplifying and propagating financial shocks.
5Indeed, that was exactly the misconception that contributed to the unsatisfactory at-
tempt to renegotiate the terms of the agreement during the summer of 2015.
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There is a representative Greek household which owns and operates a means of
production and a large external lender, described as German households. De-
fault generates an effective return differential between borrowers and lenders.
Lenders receive repayment net of default. On the other hand, borrowers repay
their obligations net of default but also incur the private cost of defaulting,
the sum of which amounts to the gross of default interest rate. As borrowers
require financing for investment in capital, the higher cost of debt caused by
default results in a higher required rate of return on capital and hence a lower
long-run capital stock.
German creditors in our model can seize a proportion of defaulted debt.
Thus, borrowers effectively incur two additive costs of defaulting: the non-
pecuniary cost of renegotiation and a pecuniary punishment via having wealth
confiscated. The pecuniary punishment for default is similar to the cost in-
curred by borrowers who obtain debt against durable collateral6. The differ-
ence in our specification is two-fold. Firstly, there is a general claim on wealth
rather than on a specific asset. Secondly, that the seizure of wealth does not
occur due to the change in some relative price, as in the literature on collat-
eral, but because of the inability of the borrower to honour a debt obligation.
We consider how varying the ability of Greece’s creditors to seize the value of
dishonoured debt affects the adjustment path of the economy. We compare
three environments. One where the proportion recovered (recovery rate) is left
unadjusted, one where the recovery rate increases, and one where the recovery
rate falls. These three environments correspond to potential outcomes follow-
ing the debt renegotiation process, and the question we focus on is what the
6See Geanakoplos and Zame (2014) for an excellent overview of this literature where
default occurs in equilibrium
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effect on the creditors of the three policy alternatives.
Our results are consistent with many of the empirical findings of debt, de-
fault and renegotiation periods documented in Benjamin and Wright (2013).
Specifically as in our model, periods of longer defaults are correlated, and the
correlation between output and default is slightly negative with default rates
reverting once output has recovered to its trend. They emphasise the impor-
tance of debt-renegotiations in default episodes and provide a theoretical basis
for it using a Nash-bargaining solution in a small open economy framework,
also see Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Yue (2010), among others.
2 The Model
The economy consists of 2 countries, Greece (the borrower) and Germany (the
lender), each inhabited by a continuum of identical infinitely lived agents. Ger-
man households receive income from a portfolio of Greek and non-Greek assets.
We simplify the nature of income generated from non-Greek assets, so Ger-
man household decisions we model should be viewed as the marginal decisions
affected by interactions with Greek financial assets, with income and expen-
diture decisions from non-Greek financial and economic interactions taken as
given. As we assume a single homogenous good in the world economy, all trade
balance effects are subsumed in the capital account.
The Greeks own a production technology (firms) requiring labour and capi-
tal as inputs. The production function of firms is denoted by F (capGRCt , labGRCt ) =
At(cap
GRC
t )
a(labGRCt )
1−a, a Cobb-Douglas production function, where At is to-
tal factor productivity and a and 1 − a are the shares of output accruing to
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capital and household labour respectively. Greek households submit labour,
labGRCt , to the labour market in return for a competitive wage wt. Similarly,
the capital stock, capGRCt , is rented from the capital market in exchange for
a competitive rate of return. Greek households smooth intertemporally and
finance their investments by issuing senior secured and junior unsecured debt,
bGRCs,t and bGRCu,t respectively, from Germany at a competitive interest rate of
rst and rut . Unsecured debt is risky as Greeks may choose to renege a fraction
defGRCt . If default occurs, Greeks incur a quadratic cost in renegotiating the
remaining amount which depends on the prior scale of of debt. The proportion-
ality factor, ΩGRCt , reflecting the cost to the default scale, is a macro-variable
reflecting credit conditions. In addition, the lender can seize a proportion κ of
the outstanding amount from the income or capital stock of the borrower (this
is the recovery rate). Greek households pay a cost of adjusting their secured
debt positions, reflecting the costs associated with identifying suitable pledge-
able assets, while German households pay the cost of adjusting their unsecured
loans to Greeks, reflecting the costs of accumulating information on the prob-
abilities of repayment. Throughout this paper we will use ‘renegotiation rate’
and ‘default rate’ interchangeably: they refer to the percentage of outstanding
debt that Greeks would like to default upon, given the cost of renegotiating
this amount. The ’repayment rate’ is the percentage of outstanding debt which
is repaid: it is 100% less the default rate plus the recovery rate.
The rate of time preference is β and the coefficient of relative risk aversion is
σ. Aggregate quantities are mostly denoted in uppercase, prices and aggregate
rates have a superscript referring to the market (for wages and interest rates),
but in some cases they do not have a superscript (for the aggregate repayment
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rate on debt); and finally (deterministic) steady state values have a bar.
There is one fundamental source of uncertainty in our economy: shocks
to Greek Total Factor Productivity (A). Fluctuations in TFP also determine
various policy rules we consider for the recovery rate on outstanding debt: the
recovery rate (κ). We study the impact of TFP shocks only, because we believe
that after the initial crisis episode in 2009, the economy continued to main-
tain the same fundamental features of experiencing TFP shocks. Certainly it
experienced many other shocks including to the political environment (domes-
tic and foreign, such as the refugee crisis) and global economic environment.
We believe that studying them and their implications for creditor debt policies
would be additional to studying the more fundamental TFP shocks the country
experienced. Finally, any shocks that reduce the capital stock and/or national
income directly that do not depend on the business cycle can be summarised
within the TFP shock we model.
2.1 Germany
German households are assumed to have an outside source of income which
does not depend on the loan portfolio extended to Greece, and reflects their
total net foreign assets (NFA). In addition, they purchase one-period bonds
issued by Greeks. Unsecured bonds are risky and there is an expected repay-
ment rate associated with each bond. The net income from (ex-Greece) net
foreign assets and bonds finances (marginal) consumption.
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Preferences include a CRRA utility function for consumption.
max
c,bs,bu
∞∑
s=0
βsEt
{[
cGERt+s
]1−σ − 1
1− σ
}
, (1)
Each period German households earn income, from their (ex Greece) net for-
eign assets and net Greek assets, and allocate it between consumption (cGERt )
and new assets. Specifically7,
cGERt + b
GER
u,t + b
GER
s,t +
adjGERu
2
(bGERu,t − b
GER
u )
2 +NFAGERt
= (Rut−1)(1− defGRCt )bGERu,t−1 + κt(Rut−1)(defGRCt )bGERu,t−1
+ (Rst−1)b
GER
s,t−1 +NFA
GER
t−1 (R
NFA
t ). (2)
The ex-Greece Net Foreign Asset position of German households is calibrated
and assumed to evolve exogenously (a constant). The return on the NFA
portfolio is also assumed to be exogenous and constant.8 Recall that κ is
the recovery rate on unsecured debt defaulted upon. It is exogenous to the
model, but is interpreted as the outcome of a negotiation between creditors and
debtors. κ is also subject to shocks and follows the following process: κt = κeε
κ
t
where εκt = ρκεκt−1 + uκt is an autoregressive process subject to shocks uκt .
7This quadratic adjustment term (adjGERs ) is used to guarantee that secured debt hold-
ings converge back to steady state values.
8One may think of this as the fruit of a non-stochastic Lucas tree. It is taken as a constant
in order to isolate the marginal effect on German consumption of their Greek portfolio,
independent of unrelated fluctuations in total German income. More importantly, we do
not allow German lenders to have alternative opportunities to invest savings. However,
the supply of loans is not elastic as Germans still have a legitimate consumption-savings
decision, but the trade-off itself is limited to investments in Greece. Nevertheless, alternative
investment opportunities would provide a richer framework to study the supply of loans to
Greece.
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The maximisation programme yields
ψGERt =
[
cGERt
]−σ (3)
ψGERt
{
1 + adjGERu (b
GER
u,t − b
GER
u )
}
= βGEREt
{
REPt+1R
u
t ψ
GER
t+1
}
(4)
ψGERt = β
GEREt
{
Rstψ
GER
t+1
}
(5)
where ψGERt is the marginal utility of consumption of German households
and REPt+1 = 1 − (1 − κt+1)(defGRCt+1 ) is the net delivery rate including the
announced rate of default and the recovery rate. Note that German households
care about the rate of return net-of-default and recovery. In the steady state,
the net-of-default rate of return on loans is simply the rate of time preference.
Note that in the deterministic steady state 1
βGER
= R
s
= REP R
u.
2.2 Greece
The Greek economy is represented by Greek households who wholly own firms
in a competitive industry that identically has access to a production technology
which uses capital (capGRCt ) and labour (labGRCt ) as inputs. The production
function is Cobb-Douglas and has constant returns to scale, with an income
share of a and 1− a to capital and labour respectively
F (capGRCt−1 , lab
GRC
t ) ≡ At(capGRCt−1 )a(labGRCt )1−a. (6)
Capital depreciates at a rate of δ % each period and labour is paid a competitive
wage wNt . At = eε
A
t A is the total factor productivity and εAt = ρAεAt−1 + uAt
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is an autoregressive process with shock uAt . As there is a representative firm,
National Production or GDP, is defined as Yt = F (capGRCt−1 , labGRCt ). Profits of
Greek firms are
piGRCt ≡F (capGRCt−1 , labGRCt ) + (1− δ)capGRCt−1 − wNt labGRCt −Rkt capGRCt−1 (7)
Firms maximise profits each period which results in factor prices being deter-
mined at their marginal product values
wNt =
∂F (capGRCt−1 , lab
GRC
t )
∂labGRCt
, (8)
Rkt =
∂F (capGRCt−1 , lab
GRC
t )
∂capGRCt−1
+ 1− δ. (9)
Greek households access the international debt market and issue secured (bGRCs )
and unsecured (bGRCu ) claims at competitive interest rates (Rs and Ru are the
gross rates, respectively) in order to finance consumption and investment de-
cisions. Crucially, they decide how much of their debt obligation to repay.
If they do not honour their unsecured debt completely, they incur a non-
pecuniary punishment, or utility cost, proportional to the amount they de-
fault upon, which reflects the costs involved in renegotiating the outstanding
amount. Furthermore, lenders are able to seize a fraction (κ) of the outstand-
ing debt from the new capital stock. We will conduct our normative policy
analysis on four different descriptions of the path of the recovery rate, κ. In
Section 4 we detail this fully.
Failure to honour secured debt obligations results in seizure of collateral.
Specifically, the amount due on secured debt must be backed by at least
13
collGRC% of the remaining capital stock when it is due.
bGRCs,t−1(R
s
t−1) ≤ collGRCcapGRCt−1 (1− δ), (10)
which is a collateral constraint, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Geanako-
plos and Zame (2014) among others, though here the margin is fixed at colls.
The budget constraint of the Greek household requires the allocation of in-
come from profits and labour plus new borrowings to consumption, investment,
and repayment of existing debt as follows
cGRCt + cap
GRC
t + (R
s
t−1)b
GRC
s,t−1 + (1− defGRCt )(Rut−1)bGRCu,t−1
=piGRCt +R
k
t cap
GRC
t−1 + w
N
t lab
GRC
t + b
GRC
s,t + b
GRC
u,t
− adj
GRC
s
2
(bGRCs,t − b
GRC
s )
2 − κtdefGRCt (Rut−1)bGRCu,t−1 (11)
where cGRC is consumption, unsecured and secured debt issued is bGRCu and
bGRCs respectively, at a gross interest rate of (Ru) and (Rs) respectively, and the
proportion of unsecured outstanding debt repaid is (1−defGRC). κtdefGRCt (Rut−1)bGRCu,t−1
is the amount lenders seize from the new capital stock, and adj
GRC
u
2
(bGRCu,t − b
GRC
u )
2
is the cost of adjusting unsecured debt away from steady state levels and can
be interpreted as the cost of renegotiating a different level of unsecured debt.
We allow the capital stock to be substitutable with income, and as a conse-
quence there is no non-negativity constraint on re-investment. The preferences
include a CRRA utility function for consumption and disutilities from supply-
ing labour and from renegotiating defaulted upon debt. The decision variables
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are c, lab, bs, bu, def, cap.
WGRCt =
[
(cGRCt )
1−σ − 1
1− σ −
η
2
(labGRCt )
2 − 1
2
{
defGRCt (R
u
t−1)b
GRC
u,t−1
}2
ΩGRCt
]
.
(12)
and permits the usual recursive representation. The recursive representation
of preferences is
WGRCt =
∞∑
s=0
βsEtWGRCt+s . (13)
The renegotiation cost enforced on firms that choose to default on defGRCt %
of their unsecured debt is
1
2
{
ζ + defGRCt+s (R
u
t+s−1)b
GRC
u,t+s−1
}2
ΩGRCt+s , (14)
where ΩGRCt is a pro-cyclical macro-variable which governs the severity of the
punishment enforced and ζ → 0 is an infinitesimally small positive number9.
ΩGRCt is given by
ΩGRCt ≡φGRC
{
(1− κ)ψGRC(1− defGRC)(defGRC)γ−1
CAP
GRC
}
CAPGRCt−1
BGRCu,t−1(1 + r
u
t−1)(def
GRC
t )
γ .
(15)
ΩGRCt is the shadow cost of renegotiation, or the stochastic discount factor
for the cost of renegotiating debt in arrears. ψGRC is the steady state shadow
value of consumption for the Greek household. φGRC is what we call the default
9This parameter allows two steady-state equilibria to be supported; one where there is
no default and one where default occurs in equilibrium. For the remainder of this section
we consider the limit of ζ = 0 but return to it in Section 3.1.
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wedge and determines the steady state rate of default. The aggregate default
rate also appears in the denominator as it allows us to consider the marginal
effect of the decision of an individual firm on the aggregate cost of default to
the whole economy. The inverse of the leverage ratio in the previous period
also enters as the ratio of the aggregate capital stock to the aggregate debt
due. As a consequence, ΩGRCt turns out to be pro-cyclical, i.e. with a high
cost (high value) in good times and a low cost (low value) in depressions. To
see this, note that when the capital stock is growing, the leverage ratio is high,
with the capital to debt ratio becoming low, and the shadow value of default
ΩGRCt is low. When the shadow cost of default is low, the firms default rate is
likely to be higher (all else being equal).10
ΩGRCt dynamically governs the cost of default. In Dubey et al. (2005) this
is a constant, but the marginal cost of default is only proportional to this and
hence constant. Here, even if ΩGRCt was constant, the marginal cost of default,
here renegotiation, is proportional to the quantity in arrears. This alone would
allow us to obtain a stationary solution. In contrast, Walsh (2015a) and Walsh
(2015b) have ΩGRCt to be a function of household wealth. As this is dynamic,
so is ΩGRCt . However, there, this is necessary in order to obtain a stationary
solution as the marginal cost of default is still linear in ΩGRCt . This is not so
in our case. We obtain stationarity by having the marginal cost proportional
to the quantity of default, however this alone would mean that the propensity
to default decreases as the quantity of debt outstanding increases. The spec-
10In richer models, where there are heterogenous productive sectors, default in one sector
will cause default in others: the chain reaction of default can exacerbate the financial dif-
ficulties of a relatively small sector of the economy into an economy-wide contagion. Our
macroeconomic variable, Ω captures this notion that industries are linked and default is
amplified as it spreads. An analogy is that if one room of a house floods, the entire house is
likely to be flooded.
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ification we have chosen for ΩGRCt negates this, as it falls when default rates
and the stock of debt grows, hence increasing the propensity to default when
the stock of debt grows, addressing the empirical findings in the literature11.
The optimisation yields the following first order conditions, with ψGRCt
defined as the shadow value of income and λGRCt is the Lagrange multiplier for
the limit of issuing secured debt at t− 1, and interpreted as the shadow value
of secured debt:
ηlabGRCt = ψ
GRC
t wt (16)
ψGRCt − collGRC(1− δ)λGRCt = Etβ
{
ψGRCt+1 (R
k
t+1)
}
(17)
ψGRCt
Rut
=
Etβ
{
(1− (1− κt+1)defGRCt+1 )ψGRCt+1 + (defGRCt+1 )2(Rut )bGRCu,t ΩGRCt+1
}
(18)
ψGRCt b
GRC
u,t−1(R
u
t−1)
= defGRCt (R
u
t−1)
2(bGRCu,t−1)
2ΩGRCt + κt(R
u
t−1)b
GRC
u,t−1ψ
GRC
t (19)
ψGRCt
Rst
(1− adjGRCs (bGRCs,t − b
GRC
s ))− λGRCt = Etβ
{
ψGRCt+1
}
(20)
Equation 16 is the FOC wrt to labour supplied while 17 is the FOC wrt capital
and states that the shadow value of capital equals the marginal effect of capital
on profits plus the increase in future capital stock. 18 is the FOC with respect
to unsecured debt and states that the marginal benefit of debt in increasing the
shadow value of capital is equated to the marginal cost of reducing profits by
the repayment rate and the renegotiation cost of increasing the quantity of debt
subject to default. Equation 19 is the FOC with respect to the repayment rate
11As in Benjamin and Wright (2013)
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on loans and equalises the marginal cost on profits of repaying an additional
percent of debt to the marginal benefit of reducing the renegotiation cost of
defaulting. Equation 20 is the FOC with respect to the secured debt issued.
The first order conditions give:
φGRC
{
def t
def
}1−γ
=
1
1− defGRC
λGRCt
λ
GRC
, (21)
and in the deterministic steady state
1
βGRC
= R
u
, (22)
and hence
1− defGRC = 1
φGRC
=
βGRC
βGER
. (23)
These results will be explained in Section 3.
3 Default and the Business Cycle
3.1 Multiple Equilibria
Assume there exists a steady state where default rates are zero. Such a steady-
state can be supported when default penalties are exceedingly harsh. If agents
do not default it is because the marginal cost of defaulting is strictly greater
than the marginal benefit of defaulting. Alternatively, if the marginal benefit
and cost of defaulting are equated, then default obtains in the steady state.
In particular, the marginal benefit of defaulting is the marginal increase in
wealth from reducing repayments whereas the marginal cost of defaulting is
18
the increase in the renegotiation cost. In our model, when the two are equated,
then Equation 19 holds with equality. Note that the limit of ζ = 0 was set
in Equation 19. Then, let us postulate the existence of a steady-state where
default does not occur and ζ > 0. The marginal benefit of default is the left
hand side of Equation 19, ψGRCt bGRCu,t−1(Rut−1), while the marginal cost of de-
faulting is the right hand side, (Rut−1)(bGRCu,t−1)(ζ+def
GRC
t (R
u
t−1)(b
GRC
u,t−1))Ω
GRC
t +
κGRCu (R
u
t−1)b
GRC
u,t−1ψ
GRC
t in the assumed steady-state. Since def
GRC
t = 0, the
marginal cost of defaulting becomes (Rut−1)(bGRCu,t−1)ζΩGRCt +κGRCu (Rut−1)bGRCu,t−1ψGRCt .
Hence, ΩGRCt =
φGRC(1−κ)ψGRC
BGRCu,t−1(1+r
u
t−1)(def
GRC
t )
= ∞. In conclusion, when ζ > 0, the
marginal cost of default becomes infinite, and therefore there is no default.12
In this default-free equilibrium, Greek households borrow freely at a risk-free
interest rate. However, if creditor’s expectations become pessimistic, credit
spreads will increase, resulting in default. Nevertheless, a credible and trans-
parent business plan may improve creditors expectations, thus eliminating de-
fault.
As our interest is the post-crisis era, we now continue our analysis on the
steady-state with default and renegotiation.
3.2 Default Wedge
We term φGRC the default wedge. φGRC is the mark-up of the return from cap-
ital over the net pecuniary interest cost of debt (after accounting for default).
It is a measure of the renegotiation cost of default. In the absence of de-
fault, the expected return to capital will equate the return to debt, and hence
12We could have avoided using limits for the argument, however this would have required
a more cumbursome calibration of values to sustain both steady-states.
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φGRC = 1. φGRC > 1 implies a higher unsecured interest rate (and hence
return on capital), or a lower capital stock and so is the effective tightness
of credit conditions because of expectations of default. The reason that the
rate of repayment affects steady-state allocations arises from the asymmetry
of the way default is modelled here. In the steady state, the lender equates the
net-of-default return on debt to their rate of time preference. Thus, a lower
repayment rate, or higher default rate, increases the gross interest rate they
demand, which, in turn, increases the return on capital and lowers the steady
state capital stock.
3.3 Default Accelerator
We term γ the default accelerator as it results in the credit conditions variable
a decreasing function of aggregate default rates. For γ < 1, a negative shock to
income raises the marginal utility of incomeλGRCt which then increases the in-
dividual propensity to default defGRCt , which then is reflected in the aggregate
interest rate, and so in turn again increases the individual propensity to de-
fault. As a consequence, γ allows us to calibrate the volatility of default rates
independently of the equilibrium average default rate, which is determined by
φGRC .
3.4 Default Premium and Endogenous Liability Struc-
ture
If secured debt did not need not be collateralised, Rk = Ru > Rs. In other
words, the return on capital would be equated to the unsecured bond interest
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rate which would be strictly higher than the secured (but uncollateralised)
bond interest rate. Here, where secured debt must be collateralised by capital
we obtain the following relationship
R
u
=
R
k − χ(1− δ)
R
s − χ(1− δ)Rs, (24)
which is simply
1− def = 1
φGRC
=
R
s − χ(1− δ)
R
k − χ(1− δ)
(25)
where R
k−χ(1−δ)
R
s−χ(1−δ) is the default premium. An increase in the default wedge (φ)
increases default rates (def) which increases the spread of the return to capital
over the secured interest rate (R
k
R
s ), increasing the required return on capital
and and lowering the capital stock (CAP.) Because of the need for collateral,
a fall in the capital stock, leads to a fall in the stock of secured debt issued
by the Greek households (bGRCs ) and the ratio of secured to unsecured debt
( b
GRC
t,s
bGRCt,u
). In other words, over the business cycle the composition of liabilities
issued by Greek households fluctuates via the default channel.
4 Policy Experiment
The repayment policies we consider refer to the recovery rate. The recovery
rate (κt) is the proportion of debt that Greece would like to default upon,
which creditors do not agree to and hence recover. In principle this process
can take any form but we focus on policies which respond to fundamentals
(TFP specifically). We model the process as κt = κeε
κ
t where εκt = ρκεAt−1 + uκt
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where εAt−1 is the previous period’s TFP deviation. The policy regimes we
consider correspond to modelling the coefficient and shock:
• Constant: ρk = uκt = 0
• Harsh: ρk = −.2ρA, uκt = −10uAt
• Lenient: ρk = .2ρA, uκt = 10uAt
Under the Constant policy, the recovery rate remains at the steady state value.
Under the Harsh policy, a negative TFP shock generates an immediate increase
in the recovery rate and the recovery rate remains above steady state levels
as long as TFP is below it’s steady state level. The Lenient policy has the
opposite description.
5 Calibration
We have calibrated our economy according to the values provided in previous
studies at a quarterly frequency. Here we discuss the calibration with respect
to the Constant recovery rate policy for the sake of compactness. The secured
interest rate is 2% per annum while the unsecured rate is 12.9% per annum.
This compares with the average Germany 10 year yield from January 2010 to
October 2014 of 1.916% and Greek 10 year bond yield from January 2010 to
January 2015 of 12.81%.13 The recovery rate on Greek debt was taken from
Vrugt (2011) who estimated that the recovery rate on Greek debt to be be-
tween 40 and 60 - we have taken the midpoint of 50. This is also the number
13Taken from St Louis FRED database “Long-Term Government Bond Yields: 10-year:
Main (Including Benchmark)”.
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documented in the cross-country findings of recovery rates found in Benjamin
and Wright (2013). The volatility of default rates was taken from the Stan-
dard and Poors Ratings Direct study “Default, Transition, and Recovery: 2012
Annual Global Corporate Default Study And Rating Transitions”, which gave
the mean and standard deviation of annual European Corporate Speculative-
Grade Default Rates as 3.1% and 3.46% respectively. The mean and standard
deviation of default rates is 5 % and 15.9% while unsecured debt repayment
rates in our economy are 97.5% and 7.95% respectively as the repayment rate
includes a recovery rate of 50%. The present value of the debt forgiven is
around 17.5%, using the model unsecured interest rate. These were set by
choosing the default wedge, φ, to be 1/.95 and the default accelerator, γ, to be
.93 to obtain higher volatility in default decisions and obtain counter-cyclical
effects of default. The standard deviation of the shock (uA) is .212%, and
the coefficient of relative risk aversion, σ, is 2, following Angelopoulos et al.
(2010). In the same paper, the private depreciation rate of capital was 1.75%
per quarter. We have chosen a slightly higher rate of 2.5% to increase invest-
ment and compensate for the static capital stock due to a lack of growth in
our model. Angelopoulos et al. (2010) have a labour share of income of .66, so
we choose a to be .34. The labour supply is set to .3544 which is the average
value of hours of work in Angelopoulos et al. (2010). The ratio of unsecured
to secured debt in our economy is .5. The ratio of short to long term public
debt in Greece reported in Karmann and Maltritz (2012) is .25, and we have
used this to obtain a rough estimate of the ratio of secured to unsecured debt,
assuming that short-term debt needs to be renegotiated more immediately.
Eurostat gives the net external debt to GDP ratio of Greece to be 130% in
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2013. We directly set the steady-state values of debt to obtain this figure in
our calibration. World Bank figures for the Net Foreign Asset (NFA) positions
of Greece and Germany gives a ratio of almost 30 in 2010 and almost 60 in
2013 which we use to obtain the ex-Greece NFA for Germany of 30 times Greek
total debt. Table 1 lists values and sources.
Parameter Description Model Value Source Value Reference
uA Standard Deviation of TFP Shock 0.00424% .212% Angelopoulos et al. (2010)
ρA Persistence of TFP shock .675 .675 Angelopoulos et al. (2010)
σ Coefficient of relative risk aversion 2 2 Angelopoulos et al. (2010)
δ Depreciation rate 2.5% 1.75% Angelopoulos et al. (2010)
a Share of Capital Income in Greece .34 .34 Angelopoulos et al. (2010)
lab Steady-state labour supply .353 .353 Angelopoulos et al. (2010)
bu/bs Unsecured-to-Secured Debt .5 .25 Karmann and Maltritz (2012)
(bs + bu)/Y
GRC Greek Debt-to-GDP 130% 130% Eurostat
NFA/(bs + bu) Ex-Greece, German Net Foreign Assets 30 29 to 60 World Bank
E(Rst − 1) Mean Annual Secured interest rate 2% 1.916% St. Louis/FRED
E(Rut − 1) Mean Annual Unsecured interest rate 12.9% 12.81% St.Louis/FRED
E(def) Mean default rates 5% 3.1% S&P
StD(def) Variance of default rates 15.9% 3.46% S&P
κ Recovery rate on unsecured debt 0.5 0.5 Vrugt (2011)
Table 1: List of Calibrated Values
Table 2 below shows the parameterisation of the economy.
Parameter Description
βGER German rate of time preference 0.995
βGRC Greek rate of time preference 0.970
φGRC default wedge 1/.950
γ default accelerator .930
At total factor productivity 1.052
η household preference for labour 7.656
coll collateral requirement .1375
Table 2: List of Parameters
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6 Business Cycle Properties
In this section14 we first simulate the 1st order approximate version of the
economy and study the business cycle properties of our economy. We then
examine the impulse responses of our policy regimes.
6.1 Simulated Economy
Table 3 shows the moments of key variables in our economy. The mean val-
ues change little across the policy regimes. However the standard deviation
of all the variables apart from the repayment rate is lowest under a Lenient
policy. For the correlation with output, capital, labour, and debt are strongly
pro-cyclical while consumption becomes less cyclical reflecting large capital
outflows and economic contraction in times of crisis. Although the secured
interest rate is procyclical, the unsecured rate is strongly countercyclical re-
flecting the procyclical repayment rate. In other words default occurs in bad
times and is consistent with the empirical literature and arguments of Arel-
lano (2008) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006). Under a Lenient policy , the
persistence of the repayment series is the lowest reflecting that the persistence
and transmission of the effect of default falls.
14Numerical calulations were performed in Dynare. We consider deviations from the level.
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Mean Standard Deviation
Constant Harsh Lenient Constant Harsh Lenient
Rst − 1 0.0050 0.0050 0.0050 0.0431 0.0491 0.0371
Rut − 1 0.0308 0.0308 0.0308 0.0121 0.0141 0.0102
REP 0.9750 0.9750 0.9750 0.0795 0.1088 0.1153
Rk − 1 0.0273 0.0273 0.0273 0.0050 0.0058 0.0042
capGRC 6.4970 6.4970 6.4970 1.1090 1.2591 0.9595
wageGRC 1.8681 1.8681 1.8681 0.1308 0.1465 0.1151
labGRC 0.3533 0.3533 0.3533 0.0238 0.0282 0.0195
Y GRC 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0872 0.0971 0.0782
cGER 0.8311 0.8311 0.8311 0.0441 0.0520 0.0362
cGRC 1.1765 1.1765 1.1765 0.1754 0.2039 0.1473
bs 0.8667 0.8667 0.8667 0.1264 0.1432 0.1097
bu 0.4333 0.4333 0.4333 2.2930 2.5883 2.0007
Correlation with
Production
First Order
Auto-correlation
Constant Harsh Lenient Constant Harsh Lenient
Rst − 1 0.3830 0.3234 0.4549 0.9381 0.9442 0.9296
Rut − 1 -0.5845 -0.5324 -0.6425 0.9749 0.9748 0.9751
REP 0.7328 0.5262 0.5887 0.9792 0.5469 0.4475
Rk − 1 -0.7556 -0.7402 -0.7465 0.9740 0.9828 0.9570
capGRC 0.9135 0.8980 0.9256 0.9950 0.9952 0.9946
wageGRC 0.6530 0.6034 0.7108 0.9238 0.9304 0.9150
labGRC 0.6165 0.6227 0.6214 0.9639 0.9551 0.9752
Y GRC 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9892 0.9941 0.9793
cGER 0.0395 -0.0196 0.1081 0.9119 0.9121 0.9118
cGRC 0.4521 0.4958 0.4003 0.9110 0.9108 0.9118
bs 0.9563 0.9574 0.9471 0.9942 0.9945 0.9937
bu 0.9547 0.9484 0.9581 0.9963 0.9964 0.9958
Table 3: Business Cycle Properties of Simulated Economy
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6.2 Impulse Responses
Figures 1 to 3 give the impulse responses following a negative TFP shock.
When it occurs, the reduction in income (before an adjustment in labour sup-
ply) increases the marginal cost of honouring debt and default rates rise. As
default rates rise the credit conditions variable worsens and through the de-
fault accelerator we see an immediate large increase in default rates. There is
also a contraction in investment (seen in lower capital stock, debt and higher
German consumption or less German saving), which through the worsening
expected credit conditions and default accelerator, raises future default rates.
The higher default premium then raises the cost of debt, and the required
return on capital, causing a further cycle of capital stock contraction.
The immediate reduction in income from lower TFP reduces wages, increas-
ing labour supply and ultimately offsetting lower TFP to increase output. The
higher cost of issuing debt results in a deleveraging in the Greek economy and
investment is increasingly financed through domestic savings resulting in a
decline in Greek consumption.
In the following quarters, lower TFP lowers the return on investment, driv-
ing down the issuance of debt issued by Greeks partly offset by internal fi-
nancing, and so Greek consumption remains below steady state values. De-
fault rates above steady state values increases the required rate of return on
unsecured debt and consequently return on capital. The large increase in the
unsecured interest rate then corresponds to a large decrease in the capital stock
and production. The liability structure of the Greek economy also substitutes
away from unsecured borrowing to internal financing and the ratio of unsecured
to secured debt continues to fall. It is worth noting that while the required
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return on unsecured debt increases, the required return on secured debt falls.
Default rates and the economy overall begin to converge back to steady state
values after 20-30 quarters when the credit conditions macro-variable begins
to converge back to steady state values.
From the lender’s (German) point of view, the lower requirement for exter-
nal financing of the capital stock, increases German net income and consump-
tion initially, but, as the need for external financing subsequently increases,
German consumption starts to fall below steady state values. The economy is
close to steady state values after 60 quarters.
Policy Regimes
The Harsh policy regime (red starred series) has much larger fluctuations than
the other ones, driven by the larger immediate decline in Greek capital and
consumption as a result of higher repayment requirements. In contrast, the
Lenient policy (green square series) insulate the Greek economy at the cost
of an immediate fall in German Consumption. The Lenient policy results in
higher immediate Greek default rates (as more of that is recovered) and a
higher unsecured interest rate. This translates into a faster downward adjust-
ment in the capital stock but also faster recovery from 20 quarters onwards.
Overall, the Lenient recovery rate policy results in smaller fluctuations and
faster convergence to the steady state.
7 Concluding Remarks
The dilemma of debt forgiveness versus harsh repayment conditions of an un-
sustainable debt position has put further strain on the political situation in
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Figure 1: Average stochastic path following negative TFP shock under different policy regimes. Welfare is the
conditional welfare series.
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Figure 2: Average stochastic path following negative TFP shock under different policy regimes.
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Figure 3: Average stochastic path following negative TFP shock under different policy regimes.
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Greece. Initially, the destabilisation of expectations due to the Greek gov-
ernment’s inchoate economic policy engendered the crisis. Subsequently, the
Greek political landscape has become increasingly fragmented while creditors
have wrestled the dilemma of restructuring Greek debt. The government has
become weaker and unstable as the latest meetings of the Greek parliament
have indicated so vividly. It faces challenging hurdles to restore fiscal sus-
tainability and promote structural reforms. Considering this dimension would
reinforce our argument of the need for a practicable business and economic
plan and further strengthen results.
The difficult political environment in Greece can be considered as the out-
come of an inherent time-inconsistency problem in past agreements. In our
model we examine only the time-consistent path of debt agreements, and so
abstract away from important considerations of commitment to presumably
Pareto-improving potential agreements. Note, however, that the moral hazard
aspect of debt is certainly captured since in our model Greeks suffer a cost of
reneging on their contractual obligations: the promises themselves are made
with a common understanding that reneging on them is possible (alongside
their subsequent associated costs).
In our model, funds arising from debt forgiveness are used efficiently. This
is in contrast to the popular narrative whereby forgiveness of Greek debt will
result in either direct diversion of funds by politicians, or other inefficiencies,
leading to deadweight loss15. We have conducted an analysis including diver-
sion of a fixed proportion of resources away from the economy and our results
remain robust so have not included it here.
15See Bortz (2015) for an extensive discussion on the use of bailout money in Greece.
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Finally one might argue that quantitative easing and debt monetisation
could serve a similar role as our debt restructuring argument. However this
neglects the fact that due to the heterogeneity of the Eurozone countries this
might increase discord among Eurozone member states. Member states each
face different stages of the recovery cycle from the global financial crisis and
consequently further quantitative easing and debt monetisation may have het-
erogenous effects, not to mention adverse effects on inflation. Certainly, the
monetary aspect of this issue needs to be studied in the context of a richer
framework.
In this paper, we have abstracted from these important dimensions of the
current debate and focussed on the economic effects of debt renegotiation. We
have presented a novel model that allows us to study the channel through
which default rates, and debt renegotiation, affect the accumulation of capital.
We believe the features presented in the model, including endogenous default
and liability structure, warrant further study on their own in the context of
the literature on financial frictions and the business cycle. We have purposely
restricted attention on the ability of these features to shed light on the issues
that we are most interested in.
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